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While there is an ever-growing body of research on neighborhood effects 
on various forms of life chances, the suggested social mechanisms still 
refer to rather ambiguous theoretical concepts. Furthermore, previous 
research seldom adequately models the suggested social 
interdependence at the individual level. Instead, researchers largely rely 
on contextual regression models. This paper addresses both problems by 
using spatial econometrics to reconstruct neighborhood effects in terms 
of interdependent social action. To this end, a rational action model of 
neighborhood effects on educational outcomes is elaborated as a 
theoretical alternative. Furthermore, using data on the transition to 
secondary school in Switzerland as an illustration, spatial probit models 
are estimated to directly test neighborhood effects at the individual level. 
It can be shown how the interdependence of parental educational 
motivation within neighborhoods crucially shapes students’ transition to 
the more advantageous school track, thereby revealing an additional path 
by which educational inequalities are reproduced. 
 
Keywords: Neighborhood Effects, Educational Attainment, Rational 
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Bringing Space into the Equation: Modelling the 
Social and Spatial Interdependence of 
Neighborhood Effects on Educational Outcomes 
 
1. Introduction 
While an ever increasing body of research suggests that individual life 
chances in general (e.g., Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; 
Oakes, Andrade, Biyoow, & Cowan, 2015) and educational attainment in 
particular are crucially shaped by the contexts in which people live (e.g., 
their neighborhood, city or region: Ainsworth, 2002; Brännström, 2008; 
Crane, 1991; Garner & Raudenbush, 1991), the social mechanisms 
explaining such contextual and compositional effects are usually 
formulated rather vaguely. Instead, researchers often refer to broad 
theoretical concepts such as collective socialization or the epidemic 
spread of norms (Galster, 2012; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 
2002). Furthermore, the identification of neighborhood effects is impeded 
by several methodological challenges. These include the proper 
assessment of the scale of “neighborhood”, the separation from other 
contextual influences (e.g., school effects), unobserved selection 
processes, or the identification of endogenous effects (Durlauf, 2004; 
Lupton & Kneale, 2012; Manski, 1993; Oakes, 2004; Sykes & Musterd, 
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2011). Although researchers are increasingly aware of these issues, 
another aspect has largely been neglected. While most theoretical 
approaches to neighborhood effects imply a certain social and spatial 
interdependence of observational units, the methods used to test these 
models largely rely on the assumption of independent observations and 
fail to incorporate any spillover from one unit to another (LeSage & Pace, 
2009). Thus, apart from the necessity of elaborating the mediating social 
mechanisms of neighborhood effects in more detail (Sharkey & Faber, 
2014; Wodtke, Elwert, & Harding, 2016), we need to endeavor to match 
the theoretical and the empirical framework.  
The aim of the present contribution is to address both the theoretical as 
well as the methodological problems. On the one hand, a theoretical 
model based on interdependent social action is elaborated as a 
theoretical alternative. To this end, the well-established educational 
decision-making framework (Boudon, 1974; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; 
Erikson & Jonsson, 1996) is extended by introducing social and spatial 
dependence among rational actors and their subjective expectations of 
the costs and benefits of the different alternatives. It is then evaluated to 
what extent introducing space into the original Breen-Goldthorpe model 
offers an explanation for the documented neighborhood effects on 
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educational outcomes. This approach enables the direct testing of a 
particular mechanism through which neighborhoods can be expected to 
influence educational attainment.  
On the other hand, an alternative empirical framework to assess the 
proposed neighborhood effect at the individual level is introduced. In this 
regard, the social interdependence of people’s actions in a given context, 
such as the neighborhood in which they live, requires a methodological 
framework that abandons the assumption of identical and independently 
distributed observations (Cressie, 2015; LeSage & Pace, 2009). To this 
end, spatial econometric techniques are used to reconstruct the mutual 
dependence of people and their choices within the neighborhood context. 
By doing so, it can be shown how educational decisions and careers are 
not only the result of individual reasoning but also the choices and actions 
of others within the neighborhood. More generally, the theoretical and 
notably the methodological frameworks represent a toolkit for a better 
understanding and modelling of contextual effects and aligned decision 
making in social research. Finally, understanding the effects of 
intertwined educational choices in different contexts also bears potential 
with regard to formulating more adequate policies for reducing 
educational inequalities (Galster, 2002, 2012; Lupton & Kintrea, 2011). 
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Making use of the multiplying effects of social interdependencies and 
taking context into account, such policies can promote educational 
equality beyond the effect of programs that target single individuals. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, 
existing research on neighborhood effects is briefly summarized. In the 
third section, an alternative model of spatial and social interdependence 
in educational decision making is elaborated. Additional information about 
the Swiss education system is provided in the fourth section. The data 
and the methodology are introduced in the fifth section, while the sixth 
section presents the results. The last section concludes with a critical 
discussion of the presented evidence and its relevance for explaining 
persistent social inequalities in education. Furthermore, it discusses the 
potential value of the presented methodological strategy for sociological 
research in general. 
 
2. Neighborhood Effects on Educational Outcomes: Assessing the 
Evidence 
Building on Wilson’s (1987) seminal work of the epidemic spread of norms 
and behavior in areas of concentrated poverty, scholars have reported 
negative effects of deprived neighborhoods on various types of 
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educational outcomes in children (e.g., Andersson & Malmberg, 2015; 
Crane, 1991; Garner & Raudenbush, 1991; Harding, 2003; Leventhal & 
Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Moreover, research concerned with the theory of 
collective socialization, focusing on the influence of local social networks, 
peers, and high status neighbors as role models, has found positive 
impacts of advantaged neighborhood environments on children’s and 
adolescents’ educational achievement and attainment (Ainsworth, 2002; 
Andersson & Subramanian, 2006; Brännström, 2008; Goux & Maurin, 
2007; Kauppinen, 2007; Rosenbaum, 1995; Wodtke et al., 2016). 
However, the suggested mechanisms (i.e., the epidemic spread of norms 
or forms of social learning from others within the neighborhood) are 
usually assessed indirectly using aggregated measures, such as the 
share of high or low-income residents within the neighborhood.  
Furthermore, results differ greatly by the methodological frameworks 
used and are dependent on the wider (urban and national) context. While 
studies using (quasi-)experimental data usually find weak effects, or even 
no effects (e.g., Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Ludwig et al., 2008; 
Rosenbaum, 1995), research using survey data reports persistent and 
sometimes strong evidence for neighborhood effects on educational 
outcomes (e.g., Ainsworth, 2002; Goux & Maurin, 2007; Leventhal & 
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Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Sharkey & Faber, 2014). Although this discrepancy 
partly reflects the difficulties of conducting large scale, long-term social 
experiments (Clampet‐Lundquist & Massey, 2008; Sampson, 2008), it 
especially demonstrates the methodological problems faced when 
researching contextual and compositional effects (Durlauf, 2004; Manski, 
1993). However, given that levels of segregation and welfare policies 
differ considerably between countries and namely between Europe and 
United States (Musterd, 2005), neighborhood effects are often less 
pronounced or even absent in the European context (Andersson & 
Malmberg, 2015; Kauppinen, 2008; Zangger, 2015).  
Similarly, existing evidence also shows that the effects of neighborhoods 
on educational outcomes are heterogeneous across individual social 
background, gender, and developmental period (e.g., Andersson & 
Malmberg, 2015; Chetty, Hendren, & Katz, 2016; Sharkey & Faber, 2014; 
Wodtke et al., 2016; Zangger, 2015). Thus, the exposure to a common 
neighborhood can be associated with distinct outcomes for different social 
groups. In the following, we will therefore take a closer look at how such 
neighborhood effects in the particular case of educational attainment 





3. From the Ground up: Putting Individual Decision Making into 
Context 
Although neighborhood effects do make a difference for children’s 
educational attainment, they have often been neglected in explanations 
for persistent inequality in education. Instead, scholars have proposed 
different theoretical frameworks for explaining educational inequalities 
spanning from the role of individual aspirations (e.g., Duncan, Haller, & 
Portes, 1968; Page, Levy Garboua, & Montmarquette, 2007; Sewell, 
Haller, & Portes, 1969) to compositional effects in different types of 
schools (e.g., Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982; Morgan, 2001). 
However, when it comes to explaining persistent social inequalities in 
education (Becker, 2003; Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Breen, Luijkx, Muller, 
& Pollak, 2010), one particular model of educational decision-making has 
received special attention in the literature. Building on Boudon’s (1974) 
distinction of primary and secondary effects of social origin, Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997) developed a theory of educational inequalities in terms 
of a rational action framework. Ever since, scholars have refined and 
extensively tested the validity of this framework (e.g., Breen & Jonsson, 
2005; Stocké, 2007). 
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However, the Breen-Goldthorpe model as well as its extensions assume 
that the evaluation of the explanatory parameters (e.g., the costs and 
benefits) is a purely individual cognitive and motivational process. This 
view of independent actors, however, is challenged by the above reported 
evidence on both neighborhood and peer effects in other contexts, such 
as classrooms and schools (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; 
Sacerdote, 2011). Thus, the question is, how to incorporate this 
interdependence into a model of individual action and if in turn this 
interdependence explains the documented neighborhood effects. 
To this end, let us first consider a generalized version of the original 
model, as depicted in equation (1). An alternative ! is chosen if its utility 
"# exceeds that of all other alternatives "$. Furthermore, %#,$ , '#,$ ∈ (0,1) 
denote the probability of success and the propensity of status decline, 
respectively. −./ reflects the importance of status maintenance, 0#,$ the 
costs, and 1#,$ the subjective expected benefits for alternatives ! and 2. 
While %#,$, 0#,$, '#,$, and (as a consequence) "#,$ in equation (1) differ with 
individual social origin (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997), we can think of two—
at first sight seemingly contradictory—paths through which 




"# = %#1# + [(1 − %#)'#(−./) − 0#] > %$1$ + [(1 − %$)'$(−./) − 0$] = "$ (1) 
Following the overall assumption, individual 8 is confronted with the 
decision on entering a higher educational track ! versus a lower one 2. 
Either of the two tracks is associated with different educational credentials 
and, therewith, likelihoods of gaining distinct social positions. In return, 
the implied hierarchy of different social positions (Breen and Goldthorpe’s 
(1997) ‘societal consensus’) shapes people’s aspirations for different 
educational alternatives. However, such aspirations are not directly 
included in the above outlined model. In a rational action framework, we 
can think of aspirations 9:#, 9:$ as an individual 8’s motivation for the 
alternatives ! and 2. As others have pointed out (Becker, 2003; Esser, 
1999; Stocké, 2007), the individual educational motivation for alternatives 
! and 2 is given as the sum of the subjectively expected benefits and their 
instrumentality for status maintenance: 
9# = 1# + '# × (−./)	  and    1$ + '$ × (−./) = 9$. (2) 
Furthermore, such aspirations, and their role in the reproduction of 
educational inequalities, have been demonstrated to be interdependent 
within a given context (e.g., a classroom or a network of peers 
(Carbonaro, 1998; Coleman, 1988; Duncan et al., 1968; Lupton & Kintrea, 
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2011; MacLeod, 2011; Roth, 2017; Sewell & Armer, 1966; Sewell et al., 
1969). Hence, the empirically documented interdependence of 
aspirations, translated into a rational action framework (framed as 
people’s educational motivations), can be expected to work through one 
or several of the parameters 1#,$, '#,$, or −./. More specifically, we can 
assume an effect of the aforementioned societal consensus regarding a 
hierarchical order of class positions on the subjectively expected risk of 
status decline '#,$. Given individual social status, one’s beliefs about the 
risk of status decline as a consequence of the pursuit of alternatives ! or 
2 are partially shaped by interactions with others. In these interactions, 
people obtain information about others’ assessments of '#,$, which, in 
turn, contributes to the formation of the societal consensus (the social 
status .=> of,  for example, a medical doctor exceeds the social status of 
.=?, e.g., a teacher, if people regard .=> but not .=? as sufficient for 
maintaining their social status). A similar argument can be made in the 
case of the benefits 1#,$. Although the individual assessments of the 
benefits of alternative ! or 2 are assumed to be constant within a given 
social stratum (Becker, 2003), the exchange with others might effect a 
change in the evaluation of the benefits, especially in the case of cross-
cutting social ties (Burt, 2000; MacLeod, 2011). In their interaction with 
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members of the upper class, parents of lower social classes might obtain 
new information about the value of further education or the workings of 
the education system. Finally, the importance people attribute to 
maintaining their social status (−./) is most likely constitutes an 
individual assessment, shifted by individual social status. Although the 
societal context clearly structures in how far a decline in social status must 
be considered a “loss,” it seems rather unlikely that the interaction with 
others directly changes one’s expectation of a potential status decline, 
other than through '#,$. Allowing for significant others’ influences in the 
Breen-Goldthorpe model (in the present context: of other parents in the 
neighborhood), we can rewrite 8’s educational motivation for the higher 
track ! and the lower track 2 as the sum of the individual educational 
motivation (9:# and 9:$) and a weighted influence of his or her neighbors’ 
motivation for the same alternatives (9@# and 9@$): 











In equation (3), E:@ is an element of a binary contiguity matrix P, 
indicating whether two observations, 8 and Q, are “neighbors” and a weight 
D@#,$. Equation (3) thus allows for the subjective expected utility of the two 
tracks ! and 2 to depend upon others’ educational motivation for the same 
alternatives. In addition, the likelihood %#,$ of successfully completing 
alternatives ! and 2 is assumed to be interdependent due to the same 
arguments just made for '#,$. Although one can imagine that the 
subjective evaluation of the costs might also change as a function of 
additional information provided by others (for example by correcting for a 
lower class parents’ overestimation of the costs (Becker, 2003)), the 
effective, measurable costs, 0#,$, are assumed to be fixed (Paulus & 
Blossfeld, 2007). On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
especially the assessment of the opportunity costs of (not) following either 
the lower or the higher track changes as a function of the interaction with 
others (Stocké, 2007). Nevertheless, the individual assessment of the 
direct monetary costs is not expected to change with others’ expectations. 
When it comes to the investment risk 0#,$/%#,$ (Becker, 2003), we would 
therefore expect interdependence—if there is any—to work through the 




## Table 1 about here ## 
 
Focusing on the assumed direction of the interdependence, however, a 
second assumption about the explanatory mechanisms can be made. 
Although we would expect a positive correlation between two 
interdependent observations, 8 and Q, with regard to their expectations of 
1#,$, %#,$, and '#,$, the very nature of a stratified educational system also 
suggests negative effects in terms of the likelihood of attending the higher, 
more advantageous, track. Imagine a neighborhood of S elementary 
students whose parents are all motivated to send their children to the 
higher track !, that is, 1:,# + ':,# × (−./:) > 1:,$ + ':,$ × (−./:)		∀	8 ∈
{1, … , S}. Further, assume that, due to limited places, only half of the 
students will be able to attend the higher track. As previous research has 
shown (e.g., Becker, 2003; Stocké, 2007), higher educational motivation 
for track ! increases the propensity to attend it—independently of a 
student’s performance. Hence, a particular student’s probability of 
attendance can be expected to be lower if he or she is confronted with 
highly motivated peers and their parents.  
Summing up, the interaction and exchange with other’s likely changes 
people’s evaluation of different educational alternatives. We therefore 
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expect a positive interdependence of the outlined theoretical parameters 
in the neighborhood context. More specifically, the higher one’s neighbors 
evaluate the benefits 1#,$, the likelihood of success %#,$, and the 
instrumentality '#,$, the higher one’s own rating of the same parameters 
for the two tracks ! and 2 (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, the restriction 
of a more or less fixed number of places is likely to provoke negative 
effects in the case of the higher track ! since, for example, it takes time 
to recruit additional teachers to deal with the higher demand for the more 
advantageous track. Consequently, highly motivated neighbors are 
expected to decrease the likelihood of one’s own child attending the 
higher track (Hypothesis 2). Before we turn to the methodological strategy 
and the empirical evaluation of the hypotheses, additional information on 
the Swiss education system is provided briefly. 
 
4. Transitions in the Swiss Education System 
To assess whether the suggested competition or crowding out process 
seems plausible in the present context, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at how the education system functions regarding the transition from 
primary to secondary education. In Switzerland, children usually enter the 
education system by the age of 4, starting with two years of kindergarten, 
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followed by six years of primary school. Based on their educational 
performance (grades in math and, depending on the region they live in, 
either German, French or Italian), teachers assign students to one of the 
different secondary education tracks. This initial assignment is not entirely 
binding and is discussed with students and their parents. If parents do not 
agree with the assignment, the initial choice will be reevaluated  and in 
the most extreme case will be decided by an external authority (e.g., the 
supervisory school authority). The available tracks consist of a lower and 
a higher, more demanding alternative. In some cantons, there exists the 
possibility of entering the grammar school after sixth grade. Since this 
alternative usually involves additional admission examinations, students 
are nevertheless preliminarily assigned to one of the two tracks. The two 
main alternatives differ considerably regarding later educational 
opportunities, for example regarding access to higher education.  
Furthermore, until completion of the three mandatory years of secondary 
education, there is no free school choice in Switzerland (apart from the 
marginal presence of private schools (Diem & Wolter, 2013). School 
catchment areas are defined by administrative neighborhood boundaries, 
with several neighborhoods constituting a catchment area. With that in 
mind, it is therefore likely that the available places per alternative are more 
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or less fixed in each catchment area. This is also reflected at the 
aggregate level. During the last 20 years, the share of students in the 
lower and higher track of secondary education has stayed roughly 
constant with about 32% attending the less demanding track (Federal 
Statistical Office, 2017). This institutional setting suggests that crowding 
out processes are indeed likely to occur. 
 
5. Data & Methodology 
In the following, spatial econometric models are briefly outlined for 
readers who are not yet familiar with the methodology. This is followed by 
a presentation of the data used to test the outlined hypotheses.  
 
5.1. A spatial econometric approach 
The basic idea of any spatial econometric model is to allow the values for 
observation 8 to depend on other units Q: X: = YFX@G, 8 = 1,… , Z; 	8 ≠ Q 
(LeSage & Pace, 2009). As an example, the value of one’s house would 
depend on the value of neighboring houses, because it indicates whether 
the house is in a ‘good’ neighborhood or not. One’s neighbors’ 
investments in their houses will therefore not only increase the value of 
their house but also of mine (e.g., Holly, Pesaran, & Yamagata, 2010). In 
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the present context, the idea is to use such mutual dependence instead 
of assessing contextual or compositional influences by means of 
aggregated, fixed measures (e.g., proportion of neighbors with tertiary 
degrees). Focusing on the propensity of attending the higher, more 
advantageous track, the assumed effect of others’ behavior and beliefs, 
more specifically, their educational motivation, is modeled by introducing 
a (spatial) dependence between observations. This results in mutual 
feedback between units. In contrast to common hierarchical models, 
spatial econometrics enables us to model the effects of intertwined social 
action dynamically, beyond a solely geographical notion of space (Beck, 
Gleditsch, & Beardsley, 2006). 
For the present purpose and using a latent variable representation, where 
]: denotes the outcome for subject 8 and ]: = ^1,			8Y	]:
∗ > 0	
0, `aℎcdE8ec, the equation 
of interest can be written in matrix notation as  
f∗ = gPf∗ +Phi∈jk + hl∈mn + o. (4) 
f∗ represents an unobserved, continuous random vector for the 8 =
1, 2, … , Z observations (here: the propensity for a transition to the higher 
track), and h is a Z × ! matrix of ! independent variables, for example 
parental social background or student’s sex, with n as a vector of the 
corresponding effects. The error vector o is assumed to follow either a 
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multivariate normal (probit model) or a multivariate logit distribution. The 
spatial probit or logit model differs from the non-spatial setting because of 
the introduction of spatial dependence through the weights matrix P ∈
ℝr×r (LeSage & Pace, 2009). The Z × Z weights matrix P captures the 
interdependence between the observations and is usually row 
standardized.1 The corresponding scalar g is referred to as spatial lag and 
reflects spillover effects through the dependent variable, i.e. from others’ 
actual transitions to the higher track. Similarly, the parameter vector k 
denotes direct spillover effects of explanatory variables h@ on ]:∗ for 
individuals 8 and Q, 8 ≠ Q. However, when looking at the reduced form of 
equation (4), it becomes apparent that, apart from these direct spillover 
effects, there are also indirect spillovers of h through g (i.e., effects of 
others’ independent variables that work through the relationship between 
the dependent variables of two students, depicted by the multiplication 
with the so called ‘spatial multiplier’ (s − gP)tu). 
f∗ = (s − gP)t>(Phi∈jk + hl∈mn + o) (5) 
 
                                                             
1 With row-standardization, the weights for the dependence between observation 8 and 




Unlike common applications of spatial logit or probit models (e.g., 
Calabrese & Elkink, 2014),  this paper lays the focus on the effect of k 
rather than on g . These effects capture the interdependence that takes 
place through the theoretical parameters (i.e., assessment of benefits, 
costs, likelihood of success, importance of status maintenance, 
instrumentality, educational motivation, and investment risk). It also 
follows that the vectors k and n do not necessarily relate to the same set 
of explanatory variables h. More specifically, the spatially lagged (i.e., 
interdependent) covariates are a subset of all independent variables: 
hi∈j ⊆ hl∈m. 
To determine the extent, source and direction of any spatial 
interdependence, the different theoretical parameters are tested 
univariately using a Moran’s y test statistic, the spatial equivalent to the 
correlation coefficient (Cressie, 2015). The next step is to test whether the 
observed interdependence could be attributed to a spatial lag or a spatial 
error process using Robust Lagrange Multiplier tests after ordinary (least 
squares) regression models (LeSage & Pace, 2009). Finally, the model in 
equation (4) is estimated using a Maximum Likelihood estimator that 
jointly maximizes g, k, and n. In what follows, the data and the 
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operationalization of the relevant theoretical constructs are presented 
before turning to the empirical assessment of the two hypotheses. 
 
5.2 Data & Operationalization 
For the empirical assessment of the elaborated model, data from a 
research project on the educational attainment of elementary students at 
the transition to secondary school after completing 6th grade is used.2 The 
investigation took place in two major Swiss cities (Bern and Zurich). 
Students (aged 12 at the transition to secondary school) and their parents 
were interviewed two times—while they were in the 5th and in the second 
half of 6th grade. While all students filled in the paper questionnaires 
during class, approximately 63% of all parents in the first wave and 52% 
in the second wave returned completed questionnaires. Although it is 
generally agreed that missing values due to item or unit non-response 
always introduce bias into spatial econometric models (due to the spatial 
multiplier (s − gP)t> and the associated relative weights in P), there is 
                                                             
2 Determinants of the Educational Success of Migrants in the Swiss Schooling System 





less agreement on what should be done to deal with the issue (Kelejian 
& Prucha, 2010; LeSage & Pace, 2004). Given the lack of adequate 
imputation methods for the present purpose of a spatial probit model with 
lagged independent variables, an ad hoc solution was used. Missing 
values were imputed non-spatially using chained equations (White, 
Royston, & Wood, 2011), creating 50 imputed datasets which  were then 
collapsed, resulting in 690 observations. On the one hand, this causes 
our estimates to be too liberal in the case of imputed values of 
independent variables, increasing the chance of an erroneous rejection 
of the null hypothesis. However, none of the theoretical constructs were 
imputed and missing values mainly occurred on students’ grades in math 
and German, as some teachers did not report them in both waves. Further 
missing values occurred on some demographic characteristics, although 
to a lesser extent. On the other hand, regarding spatially lagged 
processes, the estimates will tend to be too conservative, as the spatial 
interdependence is not accounted for in the imputation step. These 
limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the effects. Moreover, 
model estimates based on listwise deletion as well as estimates with 
additionally added uncertainty to imputed values by means of a random 
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draw of the respective (normal) error distribution are presented in the 
appendix (Tables A4 and A5). 
While Table A1 in the appendix provides summary statistics for all the 
measures used in the analyses, in the following, the key concepts shall 
be discussed in more detail. As already introduced in section 4, the 
dependent variable consists of a binary choice between a lower and a 
higher, more demanding, track. To capture institutional differences 
between the two cities (e.g., the availability of a grammar school), we 
additionally control for city fixed effects.3 The main determinants of 
assigning a student to one of the two different alternatives are his or her 
grades in both math and German. There is, however, some room left for 
teachers and parents to negotiate the final choice of a secondary school 
track. Following Boudon (1974), students’ social and migration 
backgrounds (operationalized as parental class position, according to the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class scheme and language spoken at 
home) are included to capture any remaining social selectivity in the 
                                                             
3 Since only 266 of the total 690 cases are from Bern and there would have been an 
empty cells and quasi-complete separation problem, separate models for the two cities 
were not estimated. 
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transition to secondary school. Furthermore, gender and the financial 
situation of the household are included as additional controls. 
Additionally to students’ educational performance, the parental 
assessment of the benefits, costs, success probability, importance of 
status maintenance and instrumentality of the higher track are added to 
the model to capture secondary effects (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997). 
Using Likert scales4 for all of the following concepts, the expected benefits 
(1) are measured as the parental judgment on whether they think their 
children would get a well-paid job as a result of each of the educational 
alternatives (i.e., the lower or the higher school track in secondary 
school). Similarly, the costs (0) are assessed as their rating of in how far 
each of the alternatives would constitute a financial burden. Furthermore, 
parents estimated how likely it would be for their children to successfully 
be able to complete the different tracks (%). They also rated the 
                                                             
4 All items consist of 5 point scales, ranging from -2, “not at all”, to 2, “most certainly”. 
However, in the case of the parental assessment of different likelihoods (% and '), these 
scales were recoded into the range from 0.1 to 0.9. On the one hand, using 0.1 and 0.9, 
rather than 0 and 1, as endpoints was necessary to prevent division by 0 in some of the 
theoretical constructs (0:#/':#). On the other hand, it also seems to be an adequate 
reflection of how people assess probabilities in the real world (Best, 2007). 
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importance of status maintenance in general (−./), as well as the 
likelihood of their children ending up with an occupation as prestigious as 
their own for each of the tracks ('). Based on these items, individual 8’s 
educational motivation for track !, 9:# = [1:# + (':# × −./:)], and the 
associated investment risk, 0:#/':#, were calculated.  
As the data not only permit the identification of students within classrooms 
(Sz${||}~~| = 75) and schools (SÇÉÑ~~$| = 54), but also within 
neighborhoods (SÜá:àÑâ~}Ñ~~ä| = 33), the latter information was used to 
construct the above introduced weights matrix P. Two observations, 8 
and Q, are considered to be neighbors if they belong to the same 
neighborhood, ! = 1,… , 33. A binary coding was used to construct the 
adjacency matrix P with E: ∈ P = ^1,			8Y	8 ∈ !						0,			`aℎcdE8ec. To obtain consistent 
estimates, cases with less than three neighbors were omitted from the 
analysis.5 Note that this definition of neighbors still relies on administrative 
                                                             
5 This led to the deletion of two observations who are mutual neighbors. Both have an 
advantageous social background (EGP I and II), good grades in math and German and both will 
attend the upper track in the next school year. Since they do not deviate from the general 
pattern and given the small number of deleted cases, results can be expected to be robust to 
the omission of these two cases. 
25 
 
boundaries and therefore is not free of the therewith associated problems 
(Lupton & Kneale, 2012). These administrative boundaries relate to 
entities that consist of 11’962 people on average, although they tend to 
be somewhat smaller in Bern than in Zurich. The neighborhoods in the 
two cities, however, are comparable in terms of demographic composition 
and variation as well as social segregation (Zangger, 2015). Although it 
can be assumed that parents within schools know each other—at least 
partially—this is not necessarily the case at the wider neighborhood level. 
Therefore, neighbors, as defined in our case, should rather be understood 
as a sample of parents of 12-year-old children who one would expect to 
have contact with each other within their neighborhood. The possible 
confusion of school and neighborhood effects as well as the dependence 
of the results on the parameterization of P is therefore examined by using 
alternative specifications of the weights matrix. As noted above, schools 
have specific catchment areas and these coincide with neighborhood 
boundaries. Therefore, models with bigger weights to neighbors with 
children in the same school (getting twice the weight) are additionally 
estimated. Furthermore, models in which the weights matrix is 
constructed at the school rather than the neighborhood level are 
presented as a further robustness check. While each observation has, on 
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average, 20.9 neighbors when using administrative neighborhood 
boundaries, this number is reduced to 12.8 neighbors if the weights’ 
matrix is constructed at the school level exclusively. Finally, we control for 
the classroom level educational achievement of all other students to 
distinguish between potential effects of the interdependence in the 




In the following, the amount of spatial interdependence of the theoretical 
parameters, as introduced in equation (3), is examined. Furthermore, its 
consequences in terms of the propensity to be assigned to the higher 
track of secondary education are evaluated. This stepwise approach 
enables a rigorous testing of the suggested mechanism of neighborhood 
effects on educational attainment.  
 
6.1. Spatial Association of the Theoretical Parameters 
It was argued above, that the interdependence at the neighborhood level 
should mainly take place through the parameters that influence people’s 
educational motivation for alternative !, that is 1# + '# × (−./), and 
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therein especially through the benefits 1# and the instrumentality '#. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that the assessment of the likelihood %# of 
successfully completing a given alternative ! could also be shaped by the 
interaction with others. The subjective evaluation of the direct costs 0# 
and the importance of status maintenance (−./), however, should be 
less influenced by others’ judgments of the same parameters. 
As a first test of these assumptions, Figure 1 presents Moran’s y test 
statistics for the theoretical parameters, 1) giving the same weight to all 
neighbors (circles), 2) giving bigger weight to neighbors with children in 
the same school (squares), and 3) for the weights matrix conceptualized 
entirely at the school level (triangles). Positive values depict a positive 
association of adjacent units, as defined by P, whereas negative values 
indicate a negative association (Cressie, 2015). As expected, an 
individual 8’s educational motivation is quite strongly related to the 
motivation of his or her neighbors Q. This interdependence can thereby be 
attributed to the spatial association in the instrumentality and, to a lesser 
extent, to the expected benefits of the different tracks, as well as to the 
importance of status maintenance. The absence of any interdependence 
in people’s evaluations of the success probability, however, is rather 
unexpected. Similarly, the interdependence of the direct costs between 
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neighbors was not expected. Finally, the univariate dependence is 
roughly the same for all three conceptualizations of the weights matrix, 
except for a substantially lower positive interdependence of the 
educational motivation for the case in which only other parents in the 
same school are considered. However, this first impression of 
(in)dependence of the theoretical parameters might merely reflect 
heterogeneous associations for different subgroups. Figure 1 does not 
provide any information about whether the dependence is due to 
unobserved selection processes or whether the individual assessment is 
indeed shaped by other parents in the same neighborhood. The finding 
of no univariate dependence in the case of the success probability, for 
example, might therefore reflect different signs in the association for 
different groups (e.g. high vs. low social status) in different 
neighborhoods. 
 
## Figure 1 about here ## 
 
In this regard, not only do theory and previous research suggest that 
1, 0, %, ', and (−./) differ according to individual social origin (Becker, 
2003; Stocké, 2007) but the resources associated with social origin also 
determine residential choices and mobility (Galster & Hedman, 2013). 
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The observed spatial association might thus be the reflection of 
differences in individual tastes and resources (selection bias). The 
theoretical parameters were therefore regressed on social class, gender, 
language spoken at home, household’s financial situation, and city of 
residence (Table A2 in the appendix). The residuals of these regressions 
were then tested for any remaining spatial dependence (first column of 
Table 2), as well as its source. To this end, robust Lagrange Multiplier 
tests (RLM), testing for the alternative of spatial autoregression (spatial 
lag) and spatial autocorrelation (spatial error), were used (LeSage & 
Pace, 2009). On the one hand, a spatial dependence through the errors 
instead of through the examined characteristics would suggest a potential 
omitted variable or selection bias problem (LeSage & Pace, 2009). On the 
other hand, a spatial lag process (i.e., an influence of others’ 
assessments) would strengthen the hypothesis regarding the assumed 
interdependence.  
As reported in Table 2, the observed interdependence is considerably 
reduced and—comparing the corresponding å? statistics of the RLM 
tests—can generally be attributed to spatial lag processes. Hence, there 
is evidence for a positive interdependence and spillover effects in the 
case of educational motivation, which work through both the benefits and 
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the instrumentality (third column of Table 2). On the other hand, there is 
almost no evidence for such spillovers in the assessment of the costs and 
the importance of status maintenance. Note, however, that it is not 
possible to completely rule out a potential selection effect as indicated by 
the (although consistently weaker) RLM for the spatial error alternative. 
 
## Table 2 about here ## 
 
Finally, using linear spatial autoregressive models (i.e., models with the 
spatially lagged theoretical parameter under examination as a right-hand 
side variable; LeSage & Pace, 2009)6, the same pattern emerges. As 
reported in Figure 2, there is evidence for significant and positive spillover 
effects for people’s educational motivation, the associated expected 
benefits and the instrumentality of different educational tracks. Thus, 
independently of individual characteristics and resources, people’s 
educational motivations seem to be mutually dependent within 
neighborhoods (Hypothesis 1): Having motivated neighbors is 
consistently associated with being motivated to send one’s own kids to 
                                                             
6 These models are of the form f = gPf+ hn+ o. 
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the higher track as well.7 However, whether this mutual positive influence 
is due to interacting with one’s neighbors or merely a response to the 
observation of their behavior cannot be assessed based on the present 
data. Nevertheless, these results are almost independent of the 
parameterization of P. While the effects are somewhat reduced when  
only peers’ parents within the same school (triangles) are considered, the 
most precise estimates are obtained at the neighborhood level, giving an 
equal weight to all interdependent observations (circles). As a next step, 
the extent to which children’s educational attainments are shaped by the 
observed interdependence at the neighborhood level is examined. 
 
6.2. A Spatial Probit Model of Educational Inequalities 
To what extent does the educational motivation of neighbors affect the 
chances that one’s own child will attend the higher track of secondary 
school? To answer this question, models with indirect and direct spillover 
effects (i.e., (s − gP)t>(hl∈mn + o) and (s − gP)t>(Phi∈jk + hl∈mn +
o), respectively) were estimated. In Table , the effects are reported as the 
                                                             
7 Using a direct measure of parental aspirations (the highest degree they would want their child 
to obtain), rather than the theoretically elaborated educational motivation, results in the same 
positive dependence (not reported). 
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odds nç and kç of attending the higher instead of the lower track, conditional 
on g. Again, results for different parameterizations of P are presented. 
 
## Figure 2 about here ## 
 
As mentioned above, the main determinant of the assignment to one of 
the two tracks is a student’s prior educational achievement (the pseudo-
é? of bivariately regressing the transition onto students’ grades in the 6th 
grade is 0.58 in a non-spatial model). Nevertheless, there is still room for 
parental influences, as reported in the significant coefficients for the 
benefits 1, the likelihood of success %, and parental educational 
motivation " + ' × (−./), even after additionally controlling for individual 
social background, resources and educational achievement at the 
classroom level (which, notably, has a negative effect). Since g, the 
autoregressive coefficient, is far from being significant in any model, there 
is no evidence for indirect spillover effects that work through the 
dependent variable. However, significant direct effects of one’s neighbors’ 
educational motivation (DèêÉ×(tÇ=)) are detected.8 While a positive 
                                                             
8 It should be mentioned that models with lags of the single additive parameters 1, %, 0, ', 
and −./ could not be estimated due to quasi complete separation (Agresti, 2013), once 
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interdependence in neighbors’ educational motivation was found before, 
this dependence translates into a negative effect when focusing on the 
transition to the higher, more advantageous track. The higher other 
parents’ educational motivation for the higher track in the neighborhood, 
the less likely it is that one’s own child will attend it. This effect, which 
works in addition to the individual assessment of the theoretical 
parameters and independently of own and others’ achievement, as well 
as a variety of social background characteristics, is consistently found 
across all parameterizations of P. Furthermore, in the case in which only 
parents of peers within the same school are considered, there is a 
negative effect of others’ assessment of the investment risk (last column 
of Table 2). So far, we have thus seen indications of both positive 
(increasing educational motivation) as well as negative neighborhood 
effects (decreasing likelihood of attending the higher track). 
 
## Table 3 about here ## 
 
                                                             
again reflecting the determining effect of grades in the assignment to one of the tracks 
and the rather small sample size. 
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However, the negative effect of neighbors’ educational motivation might 
merely reflect the unexpected negative effect of individual educational 
motivation for the higher track. As can be inferred from the first, fourth, 
and seventh columns in Table 2, this negative effect of individual 
educational motivation reflects the assessment of the expected benefits: 
The higher parents evaluate the benefits in terms of getting a well-paying 
job after completing the higher track, the lower the probability their 
children will attend said track. While this effect could be caused by a 
subgroup of parents who are highly motivated but whose children do not 
show the necessary performance, further examination shows that the 
effect is conditional on parents’ evaluation of the other alternatives. Once 
the expected benefits of the lower track are controlled for, the negative 
individual effect, 1 + ' × [−./], disappears, while the interdependence 
effect, Dèêë×(tÇ=), remains unchanged (Table A3 in the appendix). This 
most likely reflects the fact that parents’ assessment of the expected 
benefits was collected at a time when some of them already knew which 
track their child would attend in the next school year. They might have 
therefore adjusted their rating accordingly, especially in the case of 
Zurich, where some of the students would attend the grammar school, 
which can be regarded as an even more advantageous alternative. 
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However, one should note that this potential feedback from the actual 
transition to the assessment of the benefits does not derogate the 
theoretically implied interdependence, as also demonstrated in the 
persistent lagged effect. Moreover, the negative effect of other students’ 
achievement at the classroom level suggests an analogous competition 
at the more immediate level (see Table A3 in the appendix). As a final 
sensitivity test, considering social interdependence only at the classroom 
level (i.e., constructing the weights matrix at this more immediate level) 
leads to similar but considerably weaker and only marginally significant 
effects (not reported). Since the main argument is based on the interplay 
of a spatially dependent evaluation of different educational alternatives 
within neighborhoods and fixed larger school catchment areas, this 
finding strengthens an interpretation in line with the theoretical 
considerations.  
Summing up, we first demonstrated a positive interdependence between 
neighbors’ educational motivation (Hypothesis 1). Second, it was 
demonstrated how this interdependence translates into the suggested 
negative effects at the transition to the more advantageous track, due to 
a—in the short run—fixed number of seats within prespecified school 
catchment areas that recruit pupils from adjacent neighborhoods 
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(Hypothesis 2). Thus, we find a complex puzzle of simultaneously positive 
and negative externalities of one’s neighbors that shape not only the 
parental assessment of benefits and attendance probabilities of different 
educational alternatives but also students’ transitions to one of the 
available tracks. Furthermore, the effects of others’ assessments are 
generally slightly stronger when only parents of children within the same 
school are considered instead of from the entire neighborhood. This could 
be seen to suggest that we are partly dealing with a school rather than a 
neighborhood effect. At the same time, however, the estimates at the 
neighborhood level are more precise, indicating that there is not much 
additional heterogeneity at this higher level. Moreover, the theoretical 
argument suggested a complex interaction of school and neighborhood 
effects. Since neighborhoods are the basis for prespecified school 
catchment areas, the suggested competition for the limited places in the 
case of the more advantageous higher track necessarily works through 
both schools and neighborhoods in the present context. Finally, although 
not shown, comparable results are obtained when focusing on the lower 
rather than the higher track. While the extent of the interdependence of 
the expected benefits and the instrumentality is almost identical, it also 
translates into a positive lagged effect of neighbors’ educational 
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motivation for the lower track on the propensity of attending this track. 
This further strengthens the interpretation of the above results in terms of 




While there is an ever-growing body of research on neighborhood effects 
on different forms of life chances (e.g., Galster, 2012; Oakes et al., 2015; 
Sampson et al., 2002), the underlying theoretical concepts still rely on 
rather broad theoretical assumptions, such as collective socialization or 
the epidemic spread of norms. Furthermore, the suggested social 
mechanisms are often only tested indirectly, using empirical modeling 
strategies that are not in line with the theoretical framework. More 
specifically, the existing literature fails to articulate and model the 
assumed social interdependence in terms of individual social action. 
Using the transition to secondary education in Switzerland as an example, 
this paper demonstrates how a rational action framework (Breen & 
Goldthorpe, 1997) can fruitfully be extended to incorporate a channel of 
neighborhood effects on educational attainment. On the one hand, an 
additional, contextual path for the reproduction of educational inequalities 
38 
 
in terms of individual social action is proposed. On the other hand, 
modeling the social interdependence using spatial econometrics sheds 
further light on potential mechanisms of neighborhood effects. Using 
spatial autoregressive linear and probit models, it is demonstrated how 
people adjust their expectations of the benefits and instrumentality of 
different educational tracks according to their neighbors’ views. 
Furthermore, it is shown how this interdependence then shapes their 
educational choices. As expected, the main source of interdependence at 
the neighborhood level is identified in parents’ educational motivations 
(1 + ' × (−./), rather than in the investment risk (0/%). This 
interdependence cannot be attributed to individual resources or tastes 
and suggests a spillover from adjacent observations (i.e., their 
neighbors). However, negative effects emerge when it comes to the 
consequences of said interdependence in terms of students’ transition to 
secondary school. Facing highly motivated neighbors is associated with 
lower chances of attending the more advantageous track. Taken together 
with the observed negative impact of peers’ achievement at the 
classroom level, this finding suggests that competition processes are at 
work (Galster, 2012; Sacerdote, 2011). As educational motivation 
increases with social status (Becker, 2003; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997), 
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this result does not directly challenge the general finding of a positive 
influence of high status neighborhoods on educational outcomes (e.g., 
Ainsworth, 2002; Andersson & Malmberg, 2015). However, it 
nevertheless stresses the importance of considering non-uniform 
neighborhood influences for different social groups. Given the strong 
association between individual resources, educational achievement, 
educational motivation and residential mobility (Galster & Hedman, 2013), 
this suggests further obstacles for those with less fortunate backgrounds 
who are facing highly competitive, resource-rich peers. 
Although different steps have been taken to make sure that we are indeed 
dealing with social and spatial interdependence at the neighborhood 
level, a potential selection problem cannot be completely rejected. In this 
respect, however, the estimated spatial Durbin models are an especially 
promising approach, since it has been shown that the estimation of spatial 
spillover effects in these kind of models are quite robust to omitted 
variable and selection bias (LeSage & Pace, 2009). Nevertheless, rather 
than documenting a causal neighborhood effect, we describe a cross-
sectional spatial interdependence in neighbors’ educational decision 
making. Furthermore, the testing of different specifications of the weights 
matrix P, reflecting the proposed interdependence in the empirical 
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models, rendered slightly stronger, although less precise, effects when 
only parents within the same school rather than all neighbors were 
considered. In line with the theoretical argument (approximately fixed 
number of places for the more advantageous alternative), it is thus 
possible that the documented neighborhood effect works—at least 
partially—through schools rather than directly from one neighbor to 
another. Similarly, using spatial econometric models might also be a 
source of additional, namely aggregation, bias. In this regard, it is possible 
that results are driven not only by the general specification of the 
underlying weights matrix P but also by the relative weights E:@. 
However, this issue was addressed by focusing solely on cases with at 
least three neighbors. However, this last point does not diminish the 
relevance of spatial econometric models for sociological research. They 
are by no means restricted to a merely geographical notion of space 
(Beck et al., 2006). Instead, they allow us to include mutual dependence 
and feedback processes across social actors. It is for this reason that 
spatial econometric models are not only a promising strategy to 
dynamically model contextual and compositional effects (as opposed to 
the common hierarchical models), but they more generally allow for the 
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incorporation of the interdependence suggested by many theories that 
build on social action and aligned decision making. 
Finally, the finding of simultaneous positive and negative neighborhood 
effects strongly speaks against  linear-in-means interpretations of 
neighborhood effects in general (Sacerdote, 2011; Sharkey & Faber, 
2014). Instead, future research should consider various, and even 
competing, social mechanisms simultaneously. Furthermore, these 
results advocate for the importance of policies that abandon the view of 
atomized individuals. Hence, successful interventions for reducing 
educational inequalities should carefully examine the possible 
consequences of multiplier effects within a neighborhood context (Durlauf 
& Ioannides, 2010). While such policies might fruitfully make use of such 
social and spatial multipliers (Lupton & Kintrea, 2011), they also raise 
concerns. As has been demonstrated, pursuing the best for one individual 
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Table 1: Overview parameters of interest 
Parameter Description 
1 Subjectively expected benefits (likelihood of a well-payed job after 
completing the higher track) 
0 Subjectively expected costs (extent to which higher track would 
constitute a financial burden) 
% Likelihood of success (probability of successfully graduating from 
higher track) 
' 
Instrumentality for status maintenance (likelihood of getting a job as 
prestigious as the job of one’s parents after graduating from higher 
track) 
−./ Importance of status maintenance (importance parents attach to their 
child’s acquiring a job as prestigious as their own) 
1	 + 	' × [−./] Educational motivation 
0/% Investment risk 
 
 






RLM: Spatial Error 
(df) 
RLM: Spatial Lag 
(df) R2 
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Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; N=690; Moran’s I: One sided test, all other 2-sided tests; 
controlled for indv. class position, financial situation, gender, city and language spoken at home. 




Table 3: Spatial probit estimates: Transition to higher track 
 
  !: Neighborhood !: Neighborhood & School !: School 


























































































Lagged Terms:          





































AIC 269.15 290.75 283.60 269.16 290.75 283.9 269.16 290.75 271.83 
N 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 
Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; Controlled for parental social class, language spoken at home, sex, financial situation, city, grade 
in math and German, and educational achievement of other students at the classroom level; Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, 
















Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Min. Max. 
Transition to secondary school     
 Higher vs. lower track  690 .778 0 1 
Theoretical parameters      
 Benefits (B)     
  Higher track 690 .678 -2 2 
 Costs (C)     
  Higher track 690 -.862 -2 2 
 Likelihood of success (!)     
 
 
Higher track 690 .690 .1 .9 
 Importance of status maintenance (−#$) 690 .354 -2 2 
 Instrumentality (p)     
  Higher track 690 .637 .1 .9 
 Educational motivation (& + ( × [−#$])     
  Higher track 690 .941 -3.5 3.8 
 Investment risk (-/!)     
  Higher track 690 -1.514 -20 20 
Controls     
 Math 6th grade 690 4.799 3 6 
 German 6th grade 690 4.861 2.5 6 
 ∅ in math of others in same classroom 690 4.613 3.67 5.19 
 Gender (1=Female) 690 .543 0 1 
 Social Class     
  EGP I 690 .201 0 1 
  EGP II 690 .233 0 1 
  EGP III & IV 690 .235 0 1 
  EGP V, VI & VII 690 .272 0 1 
  Other 690 .058 0 1 
 Language at home     
  German 690 .458 0 1 
  Other language & German 690 .417 0 1 
  Other language 690 .125 0 1 
 Financial Situation     
  Tense 690 .145 0 1 
  In between 690 .274 0 1 





Table A2: Theoretical parameters regressed on individual background characteristics 
 B C π p -SD (B+p×-SD) C/p 
















Parental class position (Ref.: EGP I)      















        















        
































        
Language spoken at home (Ref.: German)      
        































City (Ref.: Bern)        































        















N 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 
R2 0.056 0.205 0.017 0.129 0.094 0.100 0.104 
Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; Standard errors in parentheses 





Table A3: Spatial probit estimates: Transition to higher track, controlled for motivation for lower track 
 
  
























Higher track    
 
Educ. Motivation 
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Lower track    
 
Educ. Motivation: 














AIC 284.15 284.47 272.66 
N 690 690 690 
Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; Controlled for parental social class, language spoken at home, sex, financial situation, and city; 
Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4: Spatial probit estimates: Transition to higher track, listwise deletion of missing values 
 
  !: Neighborhood !: Neighborhood & School !: School 


























































































Lagged Terms:          





































AIC 198.95 229.89 228.01 198.95 229.89 225.85 198.95 229.89 210.60 
N 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 
Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; Controlled for parental social class, language spoken at home, sex, financial situation, city, grade 
in math and German, and educational achievement of other students at the classroom level; Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, 






Table A5: Spatial probit estimates: Transition to higher track, missing values with additional random draw 
 
  !: Neighborhood !: Neighborhood & School !: School 


























































































Lagged Terms:          





































AIC 346.96 375.64 369.08 346.96 375.64 370.14 346.96 375.64 323.92 
N 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 
Source: DEBIMISS, own calculations; Controlled for parental social class, language spoken at home, sex, financial situation, city, grade 
in math and German, and educational achievement of other students at the classroom level; Standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.10, 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
